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Abstract
A detailed empirical analysis of the productivity of non financial firms across several countries
and years shows that productivity follows a non-Gaussian distribution with power law tails. We
demonstrate that these empirical findings can be interpreted as consequence of a mechanism of
exchanges in a social network where firms improve their productivity by direct innovation or/and
by imitation of other firm’s technological and organizational solutions. The type of network-
connectivity determines how fast and how efficiently information can diffuse and how quickly
innovation will permeate or behaviors will be imitated. From a model for innovation flow through
a complex network we obtain that the expectation values of the productivity level are proportional
to the connectivity of the network of links between firms. The comparison with the empirical
distributions reveals that such a network must be of a scale-free type with a power-law degree
distribution in the large connectivity range.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the availability of huge sets of longitudinal firm-level data has generated a
soars of productivity studies in the economic literature [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. There are several
measures of productivity [8], in this work we consider two basic measures: labour and
capital productivity. The Labour productivity is defined as value added over the amount
of employees (where value added, defined according to standard balance sheet reporting,
is the difference between total revenue and cost of input excluding the cost of labour).
Although elementary, this measure has the advantage of being accurately approximated
given the available data. The other alternative measure is the capital productivity which
is defined as the ratio between value added and fixed assets (i.e. capital). This second
measure has some weakness since the firms’ assets change continuously in time (consider
for instance the value associated with the stock price). Usually the literature recognizes
that the productivity distribution is not normally distributed [7], and empirically ‘fat tails’
with power law behaviors are observed. But the mainstream proposed explanations cannot
retrieve this power law tails yielding -at best- to log-normal distributions [9, 10]. According
to the evolutionary perspective [11, 12], firms improve their productivity implementing new
technological and organizational solutions and, by this way, upgrading their routines. The
search for more efficient technologies is carried out in two ways: (1) by innovation (direct
search of more efficient routines); (2) by imitation of the most innovative firms [13, 14]. In
practice, one can figure out that once new ideas or innovative solutions are conceived by
a given firm then they will percolate outside the firm that originally generated them by
imitation from other firms. In this way the innovation flows through the firms. Therefore,
the network of contacts between firms which allows such a propagation must play a decisive
role in the process.
In this paper we introduce a model for the production and flow of innovation in a complex
network linking the firms. We show that the resulting productivity distribution is shaped by
the connectivity distribution of this network and in particular we demonstrate that power
law tails emerge when the contact-network is of a scale-free type. These theoretical finding
are corroborated by a large empirical investigation based on the data set Amadeus, which
records data of over 6 million European firms from 1990 to 2002 [15]. A statistical analysis of
such a data reveals that: (i) the productivity is power law distributed in the tail region; (ii)
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this result is robust to different measures of productivity (added value-capital and capital-
labor ratios); and (iii) it is persistent over time and countries [15]. A comparison with the
theoretical prediction reveals that the empirical data are well interpreted by assuming that
the contact network is of scale-free type with power law tailed degree distributions.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II recalls the concept of social network; Section
III introduces the model supporting the technological distribution while Section IV describes
the empirical findings. A conclusive section summarizes the main results.
II. CONTACT NETWORKS IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS
Systems constituted of many elements can be naturally associated with networks link-
ing interacting constituents. Examples in natural and artificial systems are: food webs,
ecosystems, protein domains, Internet, power grids. In social systems, networks also emerge
from the linkage of people or group of people with some pattern of contacts or interactions.
Examples are: friendships between individuals, business relationships between companies,
citations of scientific papers, intermarriages between families, sexual contacts. The relevance
of the underlying connection-network arises when the collective dynamics of these systems
is considered. Recently, the discovery that, above a certain degree of complexity, natural,
artificial and social systems are typically characterized by networks with power-law distri-
butions in the number of links per node (degree distribution), has attracted a great deal of
scientific interest [16, 17, 18]. Such networks are commonly referred as scale-free networks
and have degree distribution: pk ∼ k
−α (with pk the probability that a vertex in the network
chosen uniformly at random has degree k). In scale-free networks most nodes have only a
small number of links, but a significant number of nodes have a large number of links, and
all frequencies of links in between these extremes are represented. The earliest published
example of a scale-free network is probably the study of Price [19] for the network of ci-
tations between scientific papers. Price found that the exponent α has value 2.5 (later he
reported a more accurate figure of α = 3.04). More recently, power law degree distributions
have been observed in several networks, including other citation networks, the World Wide
Web, the Internet, metabolic networks, telephone calls and the networks of human sexual
contacts [17, 18, 20, 21, 22]. All theses systems have values of the exponents α in a range
between 0.66 and 4, with most occurrences between 2 and 3 [23, 24, 25, 26].
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When analyzing the industrial dynamics, it is quite natural to consider the firms as
interacting within a network of contacts and communications. In particular, when the
productivity is concerned, such a network is the structure through which firms can imitate
each-other. Our approach mimics such a dynamics by considering simple type of interactions
but assuming that they take place through a complex network of contacts.
III. INNOVATION FLOW
The innovation originally introduced in a given firm ‘i’ at a certain time t can spread
by imitation across the network of contacts between firms. In this way, interactions force
agents to progressively adapt to an ever changing environment.
In this section we introduce a model for the flow of innovation through the system of firms.
We start from the following equation describing the evolution in time of the productivity xl
of a given firm ‘l’:
xl(t + 1) = xl(t) + Al(t) +
∑
j∈Il
Qj→l(t)[xj(t)− xj(t− 1)] (1)
−
t−1∑
τ=l
q
(τ)
l (t)[xl(t− τ)− xl(t− τ − 1)].
The term Al(t) is a stochastic additive quantity which accounts the progresses in productivity
due to innovation. The terms Qj→l are instead exchange factors which model the imitation
between firms. These terms take into account the improvement of the productivity of the firm
’l’ in consequence of the imitation of the processes and innovations that had improved the
productivity of the firm ’j’ at a previous time. Such coefficients are in general smaller than
one because the firms tend to protect their innovation content and therefore the imitation is
-in general- incomplete. In the following we will consider only the static cases where these
quantity are independent on t. The term q
(τ)
l is:
q
(1)
l =
∑
j∈Il
Qj→lQl→j for τ = 1 (2)
q
(τ)
l =
∑
j∈Il
Qj→l
∑
h1...hτ−1
Ql→h1Qh1→h2 . . . Qhτ−1→j for τ ≥ 2. (3)
This term excludes back-propagation: firm ‘l’ imitates only improvements of the productivity
of firm ‘j’ which have not been originated by imitation of improvements occurred at the firm
4
‘l’ itself at some previous time. The system described by Equation 1 can be viewed as a
system of self-avoiding random walkers with sources and traps.
The probability Pt+1(y, l)dy that the firm l at the time t+1 has a productivity between y
and y+ dy is related to the probabilities to have a set {Qj→l} of interaction coefficients and
a set of additive coefficients {Al(t)} such that a given distribution of productivity {xj(t)} at
the time t yields, through Equation 1, to the quantity y for the agent l at time t + 1. This
is:
Pt+1(y, l) =
∫
∞
−∞
daΛt(a, l)
t−1∏
ξ=0
∫
∞
−∞
dx
(ξ)
1 Pt−ξ(x
(ξ)
1 , 1) · · · (4)
∫
∞
−∞
dx
(ξ)
N Pt−ξ(x
(ξ)
N , N)
δ
(
y − a− x
(0)
l −
∑
j∈Il
[x
(0)
j − x
(1)
j ]Qj→l +
t−1∑
τ=l
q
(τ)
l [x
(τ)
l − x
(τ+1)
l ]
)
,
where δ(y) is the Dirac delta function and Λt(a, l) is the probability density to have at time
t on site l an additive coefficient Al(t) = a. Let us introduce the Fourier transformation of
Pt(y, l) and its inverse
Pˆt(ϕ, l) =
∫
∞
−∞
dye+iyϕPt(y, l)
Pt(y, l) =
1
2pi
∫
∞
−∞
dϕe−iyϕPˆt(ϕ, l) . (5)
In appendix A, we show that Equation 4 can be re-written in term of these transformations,
resulting in:
Pˆt+1(ϕ, l) = Λˆt(ϕ, l)Pˆt(ϕ, l)
t−1∏
ξ=2
Pˆt−ξ((−q
(ξ)
l + q
(ξ−1)
l )ϕ, l)
Pˆ0(q
(t−1)
l ϕ, l)Pˆt−1(−q
(1)
l ϕ, l) (6)∏
j∈Il
Pˆt(Qj→lϕ, j)Pˆt−1(−Qj→lϕ, j) ,
with Λˆt(ϕ, l) being the Fourier transform of Λt(a, l). From this equation we can construct
a relation for the propagation of the cumulants of the productivity distribution. Indeed, by
definition the cumulants of a probability distribution are given by the expression:
k
(ν)
l (t) = (−i)
ν d
ν
dϕν
ln Pˆt(ϕ, l)
∣∣∣
ϕ=0
, (7)
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where the first cumulant k
(1)
l (t) is the expectation value of the stochastic variable xl at
the time t (〈xl(t)〉) and the second cumulant k
(2)
l (t) is its variance (σ
2
l (t)). By taking the
logarithm of Equation 6 and applying Equation 7 we get:
k
(ν)
l (t+ 1) = c
(ν)(t) + k
(ν)
l (t) +
t−1∑
ξ=2
(q
(ξ−1)
l − q
(ξ)
l )
νk
(ν)
l (t− ξ)
+(q
(t−1)
l )
νk
(ν)
l (0) + (−q
(1)
l )
νk
(ν)
l (t− 1) + (8)∑
j∈Il
[(Qj→l)
ν k
(ν)
j (t) + (−Qj→l)
ν k
(ν)
j (t− 1)] .
It has been established by Maddison that the average innovation rate of change in the
OECD countries since 1870 has been roughly constant [27]. In our formalism this implies
〈Al(t + 1)〉 − 〈Al(t)〉
〈Al(t)〉
∼ const. (9)
Therefore, the mean of the additive term in Equation 1 (〈Al(t)〉) must grow exponentially
with time and consequently the first cumulant (the average indeed) reads: c(1) = c
(1)
0 (c
(1)
1 )
t.
Equivalently we assume an exponential growth also for the other moments (c(ν) = c
(1)
0 (c
(ν)
1 )
t).
Equation 8 can now be solved by using a mean-field, self-consistent solution (neglecting
correlations and fluctuations in the interacting firms) obtaining:
k
(1)
l (t) =
1
A
c
(1)
0 c
(1)
1
(c
(1)
1 − 1)
[
1 + a¯Qzl
]
(c
(1)
1 )
t for ν = 1
k
(ν)
l (t) =
c
(ν)
0
Bν
[
1 + (1 +
(−1)ν
c
(ν)
1
)b¯(ν)Qνzl
]
(c
(ν)
1 )
t for ν > 1 (10)
where
a¯ =
1
1−
〈
Qzl
A
〉 1
〈A〉
(11)
b¯(ν) =
1
1 +
〈
(1+(−1)ν/c
(ν)
1 )Q
νzl
Bν
〉 1
〈Bν〉
(12)
and
A = c
(1)
1 + zl
t−1∑
ξ=1
Qξ+1
(c
(1)
1 )
ξ
(13)
Bν = −1 + c
(ν)
1 − z
ν
l
[(−Q2)ν
c
(ν)
1
+
t−1∑
ξ=2
(Qξ −Qξ+1)ν
(c
(ν)
1 )
ξ
+
(Qt)ν
(c
(ν)
1 )
t
]
(14)
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with Q being the average exchange factor. When this exchange term is small, Equation 10
can be highly simplified by taking the first order in Q only, leading to:
k
(1)
l (t) ∼
c
(1)
0
c
(1)
1 − 1
[
1 + zl
Q
c
(1)
1
]
(c
(1)
1 )
t
k
(ν)
l (t) ∼
c
(ν)
0
c
(ν)
1 − 1
(c
(ν)
1 )
t (15)
Equation 10 (and its simplified form (Equation 15)) describes a mean productivity which
grows at the same rate of the mean innovation growth (as a power of c
(1)
1 ) and is directly
proportional to the number of connections that the firm has in the exchange network. From
Equation 10 we also have that all the cumulants increase with a corresponding power rate
((c
(ν)
1 )
t). But, if we analyze the normalized cumulants : λ(ν)(t) = k
(ν)
l (t)/[k
(2)
l (t)]
ν/2 we
immediately see that at large t they all tend to zero excepted for the mean and the variance.
Therefore the probability distributions tend to Gaussians at large times.
Summarizing, in this section we have shown that, at large t, the expectation value of
the productivity level of a given firm is proportional to its connectivity in the network
of interaction and the fluctuations around this expectation-value are normally distributed.
Each firm has a different connectivity and therefore the probability distribution for the
productivity of the ensemble of firms is given by a normalized sum of Gaussians with averages
distributed according with the network connectivity. As discussed in the previous section,
power-law-tailed degree distributions are very common in many social and artificial networks.
It is therefore natural to hypotheses that also the social/information network through which
firms can exchange and imitate productivity has a degree distribution characterized by
a power law in the large connection-numbers region. If this is the case, then the whole
productivity distribution will show a power-law tail characterized by the same exponent of
the degree distribution [28].
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON WITH THEORY
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 show the log-log plot of the frequency distributions (Left) and the
complementary cumulative distributions (Right) of labour productivity and for capital pro-
ductivity measured as quotas of total added value of the firms. In these figures the different
data sets correspond to different years: 1996−2001. For the sake of exposition, we illustrate
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FIG. 1: Frequency distributions (Left) and complementary cumulative distributions (Right) for
the labour productivity in Italy in the years 1996-2001. The theoretical behavior is for α = 2.7,
m = 22, n = 11, σ = 10 and β = 3.
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FIG. 2: Frequency distributions (Left) and complementary cumulative distributions (Right) for
the labour productivity in France in the years 1996-2001. The theoretical behavior is for α = 2.1,
m = 30, n = 4, σ = 20 and β = 1.
the productivity distribution for France and Italy only, but similar results have been obtained
for other Euroland countries of the AMADEUS dataset. The frequency distributions show
a very clear non-Gaussian character: they are skewed with asymmetric tails and the labour
productivity (Figures 1 and 2 (Left)) present a clear leptokurtic pick around the mode. The
complementary cumulative distributions (P>(x), being the probability to find a firm with
productivity larger than x) show a linear trend at large x implying a non-Gaussian character
with the probability for large productivities well mimicked by a power-law behavior.
The model presented in this paper gives a simple explanation for the occurrence of
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FIG. 3: Frequency distributions (Left) and complementary cumulative distributions (Right) for
the capital productivity in Italy in the years 1996-2001. The theoretical behavior is for α = 3.8,
m = 0.04, n = 0.02, σ = 0.01 and β = 25.
such power law tails in the productivity distribution: they are a consequence of the so-
cial/information network which is of “scale-free” type (analogously with several other com-
plex systems where such a connectivity-distribution can be measured [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34]).
Indeed, we have shown that distribution for the productivity of the ensemble of firms is given
by a normalized sum of Gaussians with averages distributed according with the network con-
nectivity. As consequence, when the connection network is of scale-free type the productivity
distribution must share with it the same exponent in the power-law-tail.
Comparisons between the theoretical predictions from Equation 15 associated with a
scale-free network and the empirical findings are shown in the Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 (Right).
In particular, accordingly with Equation 15, we assume an average productivity given by
k
(1)
l = m+zln, a variance equal to σ and the degree distribution of the network given by pk ∝
k−α exp(−β/k). The agreement with the empirical findings is quantitatively rather good.
We note that, although there are several parameters, the behavior for large productivity is
controlled only by the power-law exponent −α. On the other hand, in the small and the
middle range of the distribution the other parameters have a larger influence.
From our analysis we observe that the theoretical curves fit well the empirical findings
by assuming the power law exponent equal to α = 2.7 and 2.1 for the labour productivity in
Italy and France respectively. These exponents are in good agreement with the ones typical
of the degree distribution in social networks. On the other hand the capital productivity
presents much steeper decays which can be fitted with exponents 3.8 and 4.6 respectively.
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FIG. 4: Frequency distributions (Left) and complementary cumulative distributions (Right) for
the capital productivity in France in the years 1996-2001. The theoretical behavior is for α = 4.6,
m = 0.06, n = 0.02, σ = 0.4 and β = 68.
These very high values of the exponents might be consequence of the irrational euphoria
of the late 90es when the stock markets were hit by a speculative bubble (1997) and its
subsequent crash (2000). The bubble increased the value of the firms’ asset thus lowering
the value added-capital (i.e. capital productivity) ratio and soaring the power law coefficient
of the power law distribution of the capital productivity distribution. However the very high
capital productivity regions show a slowing down which could be fitted with lower exponents.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have shown that the productivity of non-financial firms is power law
distributed. This result is robust to different measures of productivity, different industrial
sectors, years and countries. We have also argued that the empirical evidence corroborates
the prescription of the evolutionary approach to technical change and demonstrated that
power law distributions in productivity can be interpreted as consequence of a simple mecha-
nism of exchanges within a social network. In particular, we have shown that the expectation
values of the productivity level are proportional to the connectivity of the network of links
between firms. The comparison with the empirical data indicates that such a network is of
a scale-free type with a power-law degree distribution. In the present formulation we have
assumed an underlying network which is fixed in time. This allows obtaining equilibrium
solutions. On the other hand, a more realistic analysis should consider a non-static underly-
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ing network and therefore non-equilibrium trajectories modulated by the fluctuation in the
underlying network. This non-equilibrium dynamics can be studied numerically from Equa-
tion 1 by using fluctuating exchange coefficients Qj→l(t) . This is left to future research. In
this paper we had a narrower goal: to show that empirical evidence is very well fitted by
the evolutionary view of technical change.
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APPENDIX A: CUMULANT PROPAGATION
By using the Fourier transformation (Equation 5), Equation 4 becomes:
Pt+1(y, l) =
∫
∞
−∞
da
{
Λt(a, l)
t−1∏
ξ=0
[ 1
(2pi)N
∫
∞
−∞
dx
(ξ)
1 · · ·
∫
∞
−∞
dx
(ξ)
N (A1)
∫
∞
−∞
dϕ
(ξ)
1 e
−ix
(ξ)
1 ϕ
(ξ)
1 Pˆt−ξ(ϕ
(ξ)
1 , 1) · · ·
∫
∞
−∞
dϕ
(ξ)
N e
−ix
(ξ)
N
ϕ
(ξ)
N Pˆt−ξ(ϕ
(ξ)
N , N)
]
1
2pi
∫
∞
−∞
dφe−i(y−a−x
(0)
l
−
∑
j∈Il
[x
(0)
j −x
(1)
j ]Qj→l+
∑t−1
τ=l q
(τ)
l
[x
(τ)
l
−x
(τ+1)
l
])φ
}
,
where the Dirac delta function has been written as
δ(y − y0) =
1
2pi
∫
∞
−∞
dφe−i(y−y0)φ . (A2)
Equation A1 can be re-written as:
Pt+1(y, l) =
1
(2pi)
∫
∞
−∞
da
{
Λt(a, l)
∫
∞
−∞
dφe−i(y−a)φ (A3)
t−1∏
ξ=0
[ 1
(2pi)N
∫
∞
−∞
dϕ
(ξ)
l
(
Pˆt−ξ(ϕ
(ξ)
l , l)
∫
∞
−∞
dx
(ξ)
l e
−i(ϕ
(0)
l
−φ)x
(0)
l e−i
∑t−1
τ=2(ϕ
(τ)
l
+q
(τ)
l
φ−q
(τ−1)
l
φ)x
(τ)
l
e−i(ϕ
(t)
l
−q
(t−1)
l
φ)x
(t)
l e−i(ϕ
(1)
l
−q
(1)
l
φ)x
(1)
l
)∏
j∈Il
∫
∞
−∞
dϕ
(ξ)
j
(
Pˆt−ξ(ϕ
(ξ)
j , j)
∫
∞
−∞
dx
(ξ)
j e
−i[(ϕ
(0)
j −Qj→lφ)x
(0)
j +(ϕ
(1)
j +Qj→lφ)x
(1)
j ]
)]}
.
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The integration over the x’s yields
Pt+1(y, l) =
1
2pi
∫
∞
−∞
da
{
Λt(a, l)
∫
∞
−∞
dφ
[
e−i(y−a)φPˆt(φ, l) (A4)
t−1∏
ξ=2
Pˆt−ξ((−q
(ξ)
l + q
(ξ−1)
l )φ, l)Pˆ0(q
(t−1)
q φ, l)Pˆt−1(−q
(1)
l φ, l)
∏
j∈Il
Pˆt(Qj→lφ, j)Pˆt−1(−Qj→lφ, j)
]}
.
Its Fourier transform is:
Pˆt+1(ϕ, l) =
1
2pi
∫
∞
−∞
da
{
Λt(a, l)
∫
∞
−∞
dφ
[
eiaφ
∫
∞
−∞
dye−iy(φ−ϕ) (A5)
Pˆt(φ, l)
t−1∏
ξ=2
Pˆt−ξ((−q
(ξ)
l + q
(ξ−1)
l )φ, l)Pˆ0(q
(t−1)
q φ, l)Pˆt−1(−q
(1)
l φ, l)
]
∏
j∈Il
Pˆt(Qj→lφ, j)Pˆt−1(−Qj→lφ, j)
}
.
Equation A5 can be integrated over y giving the Fourier transform of Equation 4 which is
Equation 6 in Section III.
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